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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After the decision of the Supreme Court in the first appeal of this case, a
motion was made to disqualify the judge without cause. Arguments were held
and briefs were written. The district judge ruled it was not necessary for him to
disqualify himself.
About a year later the district judge rendered a new decision which
allegedly covered the issues the Supreme Court said needed to be addressed.
Prior to this decision the district court made no contact with counsel, nor were
any requests for information or even notice of what the court was doing ever
given. A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed. The matter was
argued and the motion was denied. From the above facts this Appeal was taken.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the District Court erred in not granting Defendant's motion

to disqualify without cause.
2. Whether the District Court erred in not properly addressing damages.
3. Whether the District Court erred in not properly finding the value of
the land.
4. Whether the District Court erred in its determination of the amount
of!and damaged.
5. Whether attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Farr West
when this is simply asked to second guess the District Court ruling.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally
construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the district
court's role as trier of fact. Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Green, 137 Idaho 832,
835, 54, p.3 948,951 (2002) (citing Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,269, 985
p.2d 1127 (1999); Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854,857,949 p.2d 1061, 1064
(1997)). Review of the decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence
supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions oflaw. Id. If the findings of fact are based on substantial evidence,
even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Id.
However, this Court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Id.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Attorney fees may be awarded on appeal under I.A.R.41 and LC. §12121. Attorney fees should be awarded to the Respondent because the appeal
brought out all the legal mistakes in the law made by the district judge. Because
of the above Respondent should be deemed the prevailing party on Appeal.
Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,659 p.2d 160 (Ct. App. 1983).

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
A. FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE

On January 3 2007, the Defendant timely filed a Motion to disqualify the
district judge who originally tried this case. (C.R.P. p.3) On May 30, 2007, the
district judge issued a MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY. (C.R.P. p.19-22) Basically the
district court stated it did not need to disqualify itself because of its
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interpretation of the case of Liebelt v. Liebelt, 125 Idaho 302 (ct. App. 1994) and
judicial economy. (C.R.P. p.20) These two issues will next be examined to see if
they are valid.
The district court stated Plaintiffs objection to the motion to disqualify
was well taken because the Liebelt case was "authority to deny the motion
because the case was not remanded for a new trial, merely for additional finding
of fact. This court agrees, and therefore denies the motion". (C.R.P. p.20) The
district court went on the say "The Idaho court of Appeals reached the same
conclusion in Liebelt. There, the Court held the rule did not apply when a case
was remanded for additional findings of fact, 125 Idaho at 305. The Court of
Appeals held that it is not a "new trial" for operation of the rule. This case was
also remanded for additional finding of fact, not for a new trial. In that regard
this case and Liebelt are very similar, and similar results should obtain. The
court will not grant the motion to disqualify." (C.R.P. p.20)
The Supreme Court stated this case was remanded for "further
proceedings consistent with this opinion". Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 641,647
(2006). The Supreme Court also stated "the case must be remanded back to the
district court for further findings of fact." Id. At 645 The district court did make
further findings of fact as set forth in it's Memorandum Decision and Order. In
fact, no new trial was ordered. In this case the matter was tried over
approximately five (5) days with multiple on-site inspections by the court. The
appellant did not like the result of the district court decision. With no "new
trial" being ordered, Topaz may not go shopping for a different judge or hoped
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for different result. The District Court correctly interpreted the Liebelt case.
The judge therefore denied appropriately the motion to disqualify.
B.DAMAGES

In the Supreme Court's opinion it remanded the case because the district
court "improperly measured actual damages for Lower's trespass." Ransom v.
Topaz, 143 Idaho 641,647 (2006). The Supreme Court stated there were two

separate matters the district court did wrong and thus must conduct "further
proceedings consistent with the opinion" to complete the matter. Id. At 647.
Those two matters are as follows: (1) The district court "failed to distinguish
between damages attributable to Lower's permissible trespass to create or
maintain an access road and damages attributable to excessive intrusion
exceeding the scope of the easement" and, (2) to distinguish "between costs to
repair temporary damage and an award of damages for permanent damage to
the property". Id. At 647. The District Court did exactly what was directed on
the remand.

In regards to the first matter set forth above, the district court ruled
there were a number of damages which did arise from the modifications of the
easement including those trespassed outside of the easement. Those include
erosion, sloughing caused by cuts made on Plaintiffs land out side the easement,
removal and deposit of soil on Plaintiffs land, failure to install culverts, and
mitigate the altered and increased flow of water onto Plaintiffs land outside the
easement. As a result of the above the district court gave two examples of the
injury cause, i.e. "50% of precipitation does not percolate into the newly
graveled area and thus causes erosion and water intrusion onto Plaintiffs land
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and the sloughing caused by the increase of water has rendered the land useless
for building and cultivating". (C.R.A. p.24, last paragraph).
The main issue relating to these findings is the question of whether they
are supported by any facts. Before going into these issues it is important for this
Court to look at the Clerk's Record on Appeal. No new evidence was requested
by the district court nor was any hearing held concerning what need be done
because of the remand. The probable reasons for this are set out in the district
court's Memorandum decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Disqualify. (C.R.A. p.19-21) In this decision the district court stated "The
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court does not order a new trial. It remands the
case back to this Court for additional findings of fact on the measure of damages
for trespass. This Court has previously heard the evidence in this case and made
the findings which are to be supplemented. This Court is in the best position to
make those additional findings". (C.R.P. p. 20) From these statements it is
apparent the Court did not want, and thought it did not need, any more hearings
or evidence. The Courts findings are supported in the record. Topaz wants this
Court to second guess what the district heard, saw and observed.
Topaz grossly misstated the District Courts findings in the Memorandum
Decision and Order of December S, 2007. The District Court ruled:
The first issue is addressed by looking at the injuries to the land
including: erosion, cuts made by Defendant in the land outside of the granted
easement, removal and deposit of sail to and from Plaintiffs land, grading,
cutting trees, placing gravel, removal of fences, and exceeding the scope of the
easement. Damages to the property which are not compensable are the injuries

10

which are natural effect of creating or improving the easement. These include:
grading, cutting trees, placing gravel and removal of obstructing fences within
the easement. The Supreme Court has said that the easement may be modified
according to the granted easement. Ransom v. Topaz Marketing L.P., 143 Idaho
641,645 (2006). Thus this Court will not award any damages directly caused by
these actions. However where the modifications constitute an enlargement of the
use or an unreasonable increase in the burden of the easement on the
subservient estate then the resulting injuries may be compensable. Abbott v.
Nampa School Dist. No 131, 119 Idaho 544 (Idaho 1991). The Supreme Court in

remanding this case has instructed how to compensate for excessive and
unnecessary injuries. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 644-645.
The injuries which are compensable because they are excessive and
unnecessary are the permanent and temporary damages which do not naturally
arise from the modifications of the easement. These include the erosion and
sloughing caused by cuts made on Plaintiffs land and Defendants failure to
install culverts or otherwise mitigate the altered and increased flow of water
onto Plaintiffs land outside the easement. An example of this kind of injury to
Plaintiffs land is found in the fact that 50% of precipitation does not percolate
into the newly graveled area and thus causes erosion and water intrusion onto
Plaintiffs land. The sloughing caused by the increase of water has rendered the
land useless for building or cultivating. This is an unreasonable increase in the
burden on the subservient estate and the Court feels that some damages should
be awarded.
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The second issue deals with computation of the damages to be awarded
and requires the Court to distinguish between temporary and permanent
damages. This case is unique because there is an overlap of the permanent and
temporary injuries to the land. An example of this is the sloughing which has
occurred on the land. The sloughing has caused some of the fill dirt to be
washed down stream and lost forever, however the sloughing may be remedied
as indicated by the proposals of Biggs Enterprises. While the injuries to the land
which are continuing in nature and not abatable are permanent injuries, the
continued sloughing can be abated if the land is put back to its natural state.
This makes the distinction of the damages difficult as it fits both categories to an
extent. The Court feels that the loss of the soil due to the erosion is a permanent
injury to the land as far as that soil is unrecoverable. This has also made the
land impossible to farm as the loss of soil proves detrimental to the objective.
The sloughing has made the land useless, furthermore the soil which has been
lost and the pristine nature of the land has been lost forever. Thus the loss of
soil is a permanent injury.
The Supreme Court has instructed that the measure of these permanent
damages be assessed by a computation of the fair market value of the land
immediately prior to the injury and the fair market value of the land
immediately following the injury. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 645. The Plaintiffs
have not proved any diminution of the property value as a result of the
permanent injuries to the land therefore this Court cannot award such damages.
However, as mentioned above there are temporary injuries involved in
this case as well. Examples of the temporary injuries involved in this care are
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the cuts made on Plaintiffs land outside of the easement, without permission, the
sloughing and pooling caused by the cuts, and the removal and deposit of soil
onto Plaintiffs land. According to the estimate provided by Biggs, these can be
restored to their natural state, drain pipes can be put in place to prevent pooling
and measures can be erected which will prevent future sloughing and restore the
land to its pre-injury state. Injuries which can be abated, are temporary in
nature and can be compensated for by awarding the amount necessary to restore
the land to its condition prior to the injury. The Supreme Court has stated, "[I]f
the cause of the injury is abatable or preventable and the injury capable of
rectification by reasonable restoration, i.e., not exceeding the damage to the
property, the injury will be considered temporary and not permanent." Alexko v.
Union Pacific Railroad co., 62 Idaho 235,240 (1941). Because the land here can

be rectified the damages are only temporary. In actions of temporary injury to
land, the owner is entitled to recover amount necessary to repair injury and put
land in condition it was at time immediately preceding injury. Powell v. Sellers,
130 Idaho 122, (Ct. App. 1997). In regard to temporary injury to property, if the
cost of restoration exceeds the value of the premises in their original condition,
or in the diminution of market value, the latter are limits of recovery; however,
because the goal of compensatory damages is reimbursement of the actual loss
suffered, the rule precluding recovery in excess of the diminution of value is not
of invariable application. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 645, citing: Nampa &
Meridian Irrigation Dist., 139 Idaho 28 at 33-34 (2003).

In this case because there is overlap of the permanent and temporary
injuries this court would award the amount submitted by Biggs Enterprises
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which estimated the cost of repair to be $42, 685.00. This amount would remedy
the temporary injuries and prevent any further permanent injuries to the land.
However, it exceeds the value of the land because only approximately 7 acres
were injured and the land is valued at $3,800 per acre for a total value of
$26,600.00. The bid also addresses problems of both a permanent and
temporary nature as it encompasses the filling of the cuts as well as remedying
the loss of soil and continued sloughing. Plaintiff must prove the diminution of
value in his property as a limit to compensatory damages for temporary
damages as well as for permanent damages. Id. Plaintiff has failed to prove any.
However, this seems to be one of the very situations which the Supreme Court
had anticipated when the standards of the application of the diminution value
limit was relaxed under Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist.. Id.
The land in its current condition is not suitable to build on, not is it
capable of being cultivated. Despite the diminution of the land's value not being
proved, the value of the land has been proved. Therefore, the Court will award
the value in the amount of$26, 600.00. While this amount will not completely
restore the Plaintiffs premises to their original conditions, this amount will help
put the Plaintiffs land back to the condition which it once was and make it
useful again. Thus, it will remedy the temporary damages while abating any
future sloughing damages and it is in harmony with the parameters of the law
and the Supreme Court's direction.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that based
upon the findings and law set forth by the Supreme Court and the facts of this
care, the Court hereby finds that the Defendant did in fact injure the Plaintiffs
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land in excess of the modifications. The injury of soil rendered the property
unsuitable for its natural use and is continuing in nature. The damages for the
permanent injuries were not proved during the hearings and therefore the Court
cannot award damages for the permanent injuries. Other injuries to the land
resulting from Defendant's trespass are temporary in nature. Defendant is
liable to the Plaintiff for the excessive and unnecessary damages caused by
cutting the ditches and the sloughing and pooling that has resulted from the
easement across the Plaintiffs property. The proper measurement of these
damages is the cost to restore the land to its pre-injury state. To do so would
cost $42,685.00, but because this exceeds the value of the property, the Court will
reduce the award to the estimated value, that being $26,600.00
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall pay this account to
Plaintiff with the statutory post judgment interest rate accruing from today.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 5th day of December, 2007, Don L.
Harding, District Judge.
C. VALUE OF LAND
There was testimony the land had a value of$3,800.00 per acre. This
figure was stated by Bob Rauzi a general partner of Farr West. He said the land
had been owned since 1983, it had been up for sale for approximately 5 years, no
one had put any earnest money on the land and its asking price was $3,800.00
per acre.(Tr. 7/21/04, p.168-169) Mr. Rauzi also testified, as owner of the land,
he thought the land was worth $10,000.00 to $50.000.00 an acre (Tr. 7/21/04, p.
167) It should also be noted in the original decision of this case by the Supreme
Court, the Court also erred by stating "while there is some indication in the
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record that the property was about ten acres in size and was valued at
approximately $3,900 per acre the judge made no determination about how
much property was actually damaged or what the value of the property was".
The Defendant, Mr. Lower, offered to purchase 20 acres of the land
owned by Farr West situated near his easement of$650.00 an acre. (Tr. 7/21/04,

p. 116).
Mr. Allen E. Burris, who was qualified as an expert in land appraisals,
testified the Farr West land had a value of$600.00 per acre, and he provided an
written appraisal to support his opinion. (Tr. 4/27/05, p. 140-141) and (exhibit
QQ). That figure is without merit and the District Court rejected that absurd

"appraisal". The District Court determined the value to be approximately
$3,800 per acre.
D. AMOUNT OF LAND DAMAGED
There was proof seven to ten acres of the land were damaged. The
evidence of the amount ofland damaged was given by Thomas Kass Biggs. His
testimony was based on his going to the property and inspecting the land and
estimating the cost to repair the damage and trespass created by Topaz.
Q.

Okay. And how many acres does that involve, do you know?

A.

I would approximate maybe 6, 7 acres. I am not good with land.

Q.

If I were to represent to you that this whole thing from here to
here, around where the trees are down here is approximately 7
acres?

A.

Okay.

Q.

Then you are talking about maybe a fourth ofit at the most?
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A.

Yeah. I would say so. Maybe a third.

The land impacted was approximately 7 acres of the entire tract ofland.
Topaz would have the court award damages in a graffiti case by saying only a
few bricks were damaged and bricks are only .60¢ each. The result would be
absurd. This is the only evidence of the amount ofland damaged. The district
court could, in its discretion, adopt this finding.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

"Attorney fees can be awarded on appeal under [LC. §12-121] only if the
appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation." Topaz Marketing, L.P., and, Dennis Lower, have simply asked this
Court to second guess the district court and in doing so has pursued this appeal
unreasonably and without foundation in light of the long-standing law on issues
of boundary by agreement and has not presented this Court with any basis in
fact or law to reverse the district court's decision.
CONCLUSION

Dennis Lower (Topaz), trespassed outside of the description of the
easement. Dennis Lower (Topaz) changed the flow pattern of runoff and
drainage waters causing damage and injury to property owned by Farr West.
The cost to correct the trespass and water damages was determined to be
approximately $45,000.00. The case was considered by the Supreme Court and
was remanded for the District Court, not for a new trial but to determine
additional findings with regard to the damages calculations. That is precisely
what Judge Harding did. The trial itself had already occurred for a five (5) day
period. Judge Harding was familiar with the property in that he had personally
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inspected the property on at least three (3) occasions. It is therefore submitted
that under I.R.C.P rule 40 (d)(l)(F) no disqualification of the judge is required
or appropriate. Topaz should not be permitted to engage in judge shopping.
Regarding the issue of damages. The court in its detailed Memorandum
Decision and Order, determined the approximate acreage involved, the value of
the land, and the damage that occurred to Farr West. The determination is
supported by the record, and is supported by the case of Nampa & Meridian
Irrigation Dist., 139 Idaho 28, 72 P.3d 868 (2003),

The Court's analysis is

consistent with the proofs submitted. If a person were to spray graffiti on a
public building the cost of repair would be that reasonable amount necessary to
restore the building to its condition prior to the damage caused. The damages
awarded for the clean up should be the actual cost of the clean up not the value
of the individual sixty (60) bricks that were damaged by the paint as is
advocated by Topaz.
It is submitted that Topaz is simply asking this Court to second guess the

District Judge who has personally inspected the property regarding the loss,
injury and damages as such it would be appropriate to award cost and fees on
the appeal to Farr West. Therefore the District Courts determination of
damages should be sustained and the rulin

Attorney for th Plaintiffi'Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the:U'h day of March, 2009, in accordance
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellant Rules, I mailed two true
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to the following by placing the same in
the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon:

Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr., Esq.
Attorney at Law
PO Box 4866
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